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Role of Judiciary in the Politics of Pakistan (1947-2008)

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Abstract

Judiciary forms an important organ of Pakistan's governmental structure. Its role cannot be denied in the formation of well-structured decision making process, and streamlining the developmental procedure. Since beginning of Pakistan, judiciary deal with Executive pressures. It is an open fact that in Pakistan, the political set up has always marred the independence of judiciary despite the constitutional safeguards for judiciary. The post-independence era is replete with examples of executive-judiciary clashes and important decisions being held by the higher judiciary in Pakistan which change the destiny of Pakistan. While the judicial revolution during Musharraf era has brought a clear change in the rule of law and the previous pressures being exerted by other organs of the government were clearly denied. Pakistan is an independent country and the need for judicial independence cannot be denied in any way. The judicial stand and the position now in Pakistan is more significant than before with clear say in the development of the country. The movement by the lawyers and the judicial personnel brought a clear change in the past status quo and the world also saw the constitutional provisions being upheld with prospects of solidarity and stability. For a common man living in Pakistan, rule of law and justice is no doubt an important issue and with the recent prominent role of judiciary with all the pressures being overthrown by it, we can surely assume a very strong role of judiciary in Pakistan in the upcoming years.

Key Words: *Judicial Independence, Constituent Assembly, Martial Law, Democracy, Judgment, Supreme Court.*

Introduction

Pakistan also when emerged as democratic state in 1947 have a credible judicial organ. Judiciary was running smoothly as prestigious institution but credibility of judicial organ was checked through the termination of first Constituent Assembly. This article analyses the fact that when military wants to prolong the stay then they need assistance from courts and courts willingly legitimize all illegal acts by developing the new principles of law. The Constitutions abrogated and fundamental rights were suspended under military regimes. The forcibly removal, valid retirement through amendment and promulgation of PCOs was not complicated task for military dictators. This was not happened only during military regimes but there are many cases during civilian regimes in which political battles were decided on self-serving doctrines.

Research Methodology

It explores the status of the judiciary in Pakistan as well as the treatment meted out to this institution of the state during various eras governed by civil and military regimes. The majority of the information came from conversations with legal and constitutional experts, which were complemented with printed materials from national publications, information from official documents, and, in some cases, firsthand

observation. The number of respondents varied, and the findings reached were sometimes speculative because essential information was not available at the time of the study. The Pakistani experts were interviewed and asked a series of questions concerning this research. Within the research design were placed various possible explanatory possibilities and does not set out to demonstrate any particular hypothesis about executive-judiciary relationship in Pakistan, but seeks to be exploratory. The outcome of the exploration has been to produce a research that follows, as was originally hoped, from the research rather than prior expectations. Historical and analytical approach with mixed method (qualitative and quantitative) are conducted in this research article. The research questions which are discussed here are did the judicial independence concept is sufficient in Pakistan history?, what is the role of executive in subduing judiciary in form of military or civilian rulers? and What elements are to blame for the diminished position of judiciary in Pakistan?.

The objectives of study are to highlight the importance of strong and independent judiciary in the promotion of rule of law and justice, determine the executive-judiciary relationship in Pakistan under elected and military governments, make an in–depth analysis of few cases of serious nature that paved the way for making judiciary subservient to the powerful executives in Pakistan, design a strategy (based on the findings of the study) which would enable the judiciary to acquire a credible place in the 21st century Pakistan. This research article make the analysis of constitutional cases in which judiciary was manipulated although constitutional guarantees are there to protect this institution prestigious.

Historical Background

Throughout Pakistan's constitutional history, the executive has remained powerful, and the roots of this relationship may be traced back to the Muslim and British era rule on the subcontinent. When we focused pre-independence judicial history, we learned that in the British era, in particular, all administrative authorities were concentrated in the Monarch. There was no black and white constitution until the eighteenth century, when British traders arrived in the Indian Subcontinent and demolished Muslim sovereignty in 1858.

Several Acts were passed during British control to regulate the Indo-Pak Subcontinent, but the Government of India Act 1935 was promulgated in the final phase of colonial rule. The Viceroy possessed extensive discretionary powers over all branches of government, including the court, under this Act.

This British-era practice was carried over into post-independence Pakistan, and the country acquired the same judicial system as a result of the Act. According to Section 8 of the Indian Independence Act 1947, the country was to be ruled under the Government of India Act 1935 until the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan drafted a new constitution.

All pre-partition laws must be followed, and new laws can be enacted based on the circumstances under Section 18 of the Indian Independence Act 1947. Under the (Abolition of Jurisdiction) Act 1950, the Federal court replaced the privy court. With this, a new High Court was founded in Dhaka, although the judicial organization remained unchanged.

The Indian Independence Act of 1947 guaranteed tenure, pay, and pension security, as well as an impartial way of appointing judges. The Governor General had the authority to appoint judges to the Federal Judiciary under this Act (Mannan, 1973).

Judicial Independence with Reference To Various Constitutional Cases:

Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan Case (1955)

The new emerged state Constituent Assembly assigned two tasks, one for making the constitution and other is legislative task for running the Government machinery. with this the government machinery was running smoothly. However, due to the Governor General's dictatorial powers under the Indian Independence Act 1947, the Governor General dissolved the Constituent Assembly through a proclamation on October 24, 1954, despite the fact that the Constituent Assembly was on the verge of promulgating the Constitution. The President of the Constituent Assembly, MaulviTamizuddin Khan, filed two petitions in the Chief Court of Sindh against the Governor General of Pakistan and asking for remedy under section 223-A of the Government of India Act 1935. t was a litmus test for the judiciary, but the Chief Court of Sindh ruled against the Governor General's order. This was first step to check the status of judicial organ where democratic state was created (Tamizuddin v. Federation, 1955).

The respondents (council of new ministers) were directed with a writ of QuoWarranto, which barred them from exercising the duties of their respective ministries, while the writ of Mandamus was issued against President of the Constituent Assembly. According to the court, the Constituent Assembly is a sovereign body, and the Governor General has no authority to dissolve it under the Indian Independence Act of 1947. Because since the creation of Pakistan the right of crown against dissolution of assembly had ceased in England.

Following the verdict of the Sindh Chief Court, the Governor General filed an appeal with the Federal Court. The Federal Court did not address whether the Governor General has the authority to dissolve the Constituent Assembly, but rather the constitutionality of section 223-A of the Government of India Act 1947, under which the writ was issued by the Sindh Chief Court. Because this portion of the statute was not approved by the Governor General, the Chief Court of Sind had no jurisdiction to issue the writs, and on appeal, this order was deemed null and void by a majority of 4-1 (Samdani, 2000).

Instead of deciding the constitutionality of the Governor General's dissolution of the Assembly, the Federal Court focused on the validity of Section 223-A. When we analyze the justice Munir judgment then it reveals that Justice Munir could not differentiate between the Federal Legislature and Constituent Assembly tasks. Since the very inception of Pakistan, Quaid-e-azam as Governor General, delegated his powers to vice president of Constituent Assembly, Maulvi Tamizuddin. The Constituent Assembly is bound to take approval from Governor General when it performed as Federal Legislature and have to take sanction from president of Constituent Assembly when worked as Constituent Assembly. But Justice Munir totally rely on the arguments of Jennings that did not touch the point of Governor General powers but technically raised the question of jurisdiction of Chief court of Sind (Pirzada, 1995).

By this judgment Justice Munir enhanced the courts powers through judicial review like chief Justice John Marshall of the USA and declared null and void all legislation which had not got approval of Governor General. He noted that if he favoured the petitioner then it would be difficult to enforce the judgment but throw the country into worst constitutional crisis. Among the majority of 4-1 , Justice Cornelius wrote a note of dissent and stated that Justice Munir followed the English law Maxims which could not be applied in Pakistan after Queen. The oath of Quaid reflect the Constituent Assembly as sovereign rather than Queen of England but Justice Munir followed the opposite track. This case was just the intellectual corruption in constitutional history of Pakistan (Pirzada, 1995).

Allen McGrath commented in this book that Justice Munir's decision was denial of sovereignty of Assembly that created legal vacuum which took Pakistan back to the initial point. According to McGrath the Government too was involved in this decision and tried to change the composition of Federal Court in Maulvi Tamizudin Case (Grath, 1996).

In this conspiracy Justice Shahabuddin assigned the office of Government of East Bengal and substituted Justice S.A.Rehman as judge of Federal Court. While Justice Akram was not in position to go against Justice Munir so he was not replaced. QudratullahShahab (chief secretary to the Governor) revealed in his memoirs "Shahabnama" that one of his employees exchange coded messages between the Governor General and Justice Munir (Shahab, 1992).

Justice Munir also defend his decision against the restoration of Constituent Assembly on many occasions and confessed his blunder without knowledge of his forecasting effects (Chaudhri, 1973).

The authority of Governor General regarding Constituent Assembly dissolution was not settled but put bundle of implications on the future politics of Pakistan. This decision nullified the 43 Acts of the parliament with single sweep of pen and result into invalidation of 43 Acts that did not get approval through Governor General. In order to cope up the constitutional crisis, a reference was filed under Section 213 of the Indian Independence Act 1947 by the Governor General. The dissolution of Constituent Assembly was legitimized on doctrine of necessity and emergency powers Ordinance 1955 was also validated. Maulvi Tamizuddin case has a great importance in Constitutional history with positive and negative implications. This was judiciary that plunged country into centralized leadership and strong executive. This was delivered against the parliamentary system, paving the door for military dictatorship. This delayed the Constitution making process and set the distorted precedent that Supreme Court remain subdue before the executive when even confrontation arise between these organs. The doctrine of necessity was emerged that encouraged army to intervene in politics.

On 23rd March 1956, after legal battle, the first Constitution of Pakistan was promulgated that ensured independence of judiciary. It was thought that democracy would take root in Pakistan, but practice proved to be contrary, and martial law was declared on October 7, 1958. As a result, the 1956 Constitution was repealed and all assemblies were dissolved. With the execution of laws (continuance in Force)order 1958, General Ayub Khan assumed the role of Chief Martial Law Administrator. The new system, which replaced the Constitution with laws (continuance in Force) order 1958, was challenged in the (State v. Dosso, 1958).

Dosso Case (1958)

The Supreme Court once again had the opportunity to exert the influence of independent organ in murder case against Dosso. But Supreme Court overruled the Lahore High Court judgment on basis of international recognized principle of "Kelson's Theory of legal Positivism. "The new legal order was declared to have been validated while 1956 constitution as abolished. With this Supreme Court clipped the Jurisdiction of courts with restriction to issue writ on violation of fundamental rights. The Martial law was validated on Kelson theory of law and Judiciary failed to protect democratic norms in the country. It put the reverse gear which military adventurism was encouraged. The Supreme Court not only legalized the martial law regime but further more usurped the writ jurisdiction of Courts. If Justice Munir had not endeavoured to please the government in the Dosso and Tamizudin Khan case, the judicial history of our country would have been quite different (Newberg, 1995).

On June 8, 1962, Ayub Khan, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, enacted a new Constitution, and martial law was repealed on the same day. The Supreme Court no longer possessed original jurisdiction over the enforcement of basic rights under the 1962 Constitution, and could only use it to settle disputes between the provinces and the centre. The Supreme Court's advisory authority was limited to matters presented by the President. Fundamental rights were not protected under the Constitution, and there was no authority of judicial review, in order to secure the executive's supremacy. Fundamental rights were first contained in the Principles of State Policy, but were later removed due to public pressure and designated as an enforceable section of the Constitution. Through the first amendment, the Supreme Court's authority of judicial review was also restored. The High Court also had the authority to issue orders in the form of writs, granting it broad jurisdiction. Judges' appointments, compensation, retirement, and transfer were comparable to those in the previous Constitution, and to ensure accountability the Supreme Judicial Council was established under Article 145 of the Constitution. Judges of the superior judiciary were appointed in the same manner as in the 1956 Constitution. However, judges were selected on the basis of bias and political favours throughout President Ayub Khan's presidency (1958–1969). To keep the judiciary under executive control, the President appointed judges of the higher judiciary, including Chief Justices. President Ayub Khan's administration came to an end on March 25, 1969, when he resigned and the country's command was handed over to Army Chief General Yahya Khan. AsmaJilani vs. Government of the Punjab, 1972, contested the imposition of martial law in 1969.

Asma Jilani Case (1972)

Miss Asma Jilani contested her father's detention under the Defence of Pakistan Rules of 1971. At the Lahore High Court the detention order was challenged under Article 98(2)(b)(i) of Pakistan's 1962 constitution, seeking relief under the writ of Habeas Corpus. The petition was dismissed by the Lahore High Court based on the State vs. Dosso case precedent and the jurisdiction of courts (Removal of Doubts)order 1969. Chief Justice Hamoodur Rehman of the Supreme Court disagreed with the Dosso case and ruled in favour of the petitioner. It was the first time in Pakistani history that the judiciary refused to use its judicial review power in favour of national law rather than international law. The decision in the AsmaJilani case helped to repair the judiciary's image, which had been tarnished by the Tamizudin Khan and Dosso cases. The judiciary established a solid tradition of bravery when it openly rejected Yahya Khan's Martial Law in March 1969 and labelled him a usurper. This paved the way for insertion of Article 6 in the Constitution and it was believed that Article 6 would shut the doors of further martial laws or executive interferences but assumptions proved wrong when military intervene in July 1977.The law(continuance in force)order 1977 was promulgated and Constitution was suspended. With this Supreme Court and High Court writ jurisdiction was curtailed and fundamental rights were suspended (Asma v. Government,1972).

Nusrat Bhutto Case (1977)

The legality of 1977 Martial Law was challenged under when wife of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto challenged the detention of her husband under Article 184(3) of 1973 Constitution. Now the question before the Supreme Court was whether to apply the precedents of AsmaJilani or Dosso cases although Constitution was suspended not abrogated in this martial law. The Supreme Court followed the Kelsonian theory and decided the case on basis of state Necessity and all actions of Chief Martial Law administrator were declared as valid (Bhutto, 1977). It caused damage to credibility of judiciary but hampered the democratic process that took its beginning since twelve years (1958-71).

Trial of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

General Zia abused the legal system to assassinate his arch rival Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for personal benefit. In 1974, Ahmed RazaKasuri filed a FIR in the murder case of his father, in which Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was named as a suspect. A 4:3 divided judgment was announced on February 6, 1979. The death penalty was maintained by Justice AnwarulHaq, Justice M. Akram, Justice Naseem Hassan Shah, and Justice Karam Elahee Chauhan, but Justice M. Haleem, Justice G. Safdar Shah, and Justice Dorab Patel dissented. The review petition for commutation of sentence was also rejected on the ground that this power of clemency belonged to the President. President Zia never exercised the clemency power even there was much public pressure on General Zia (Wolpert, 2007).

General Zia had said: "it's either his neck or mine." In an interview, General Zia admitted that whether it's A, B, or General Zia himself, justice must be served. Unfortunately, the lawsuit was brought against someone who was not a layperson but a prominent figure in Pakistani politics. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was a former Pakistani Prime Minister, as well as the leader of the Pakistan People's Party. General Zia has stated on numerous occasions that there is no link between the military and the judiciary in this matter, and that whatever the judges determine is acceptable. The Supreme Court resolved the case against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979, and he was sentenced to death on April 4, 1979.

When we study this case, we perceive that the Supreme Court relied on the confessions of Mian Abbas, a top Federal Security Force official, and three other junior officials. Initially, Mian Abbas, a senior FSF official, contested his case and refused to admit guilt in front of the Supreme Court, invoking Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, under pressure from Martial Law officials, he later admitted his guilt along with three junior policemen under same section of law. The main source of judgment was the statements of the accomplices. Under Section 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 states that an accomplice evidence is not sufficient for guilt unless there is significant evidence in proof. Mr.Kasuri also admitted in cross examination that he had many adversaries and that he was attacked 13 times with dangerous weapons between May 22, 1971 and August 14, 1974 (Ahmad, 2008).

Although there was no documentary proof against Bhutto to show his guilt, witnesses alleged that Mr. Bhutto was the originator of all 13 attacks. Following Bhutto's execution, the judges on appeal confessed that there was persistent pressure on them to convict Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and that they faced threats to their lives. One of the divergent justices, Justice Dorab Patel, revealed executive pressure when deciding the Bhutto's appeal (Patel, 2004).

The judicial assassination of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto undermined public trust in the legal system even more. If the Supreme Court had not agreed with the executive, Pakistan's judiciary would not have been suppressed. The army's sword has always scared the judiciary, resulting in not only political instability but also a negative image of Pakistan in the international community toward the superior judiciary (Khalid, 2012). According to Stanley Wolpert, General Zia believed that if he left Bhutto alive, he would die soon due to the latter's antagonistic stance toward Zia.

But death of Zia in August 1988 paved the door for the restoration of democracy. The decade of 1990's moved around the democratic rule of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, despite the fact that neither could complete the statutory tenure due to the President's discretionary powers under Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution. Although each time the dissolution of assemblies under Article 58(2)(b) was challenged. it was only during Nawaz Sharif's tenure that the courts reinstated his administration in 1993.

The Al-Jehad Trust case significantly improved the Supreme Court's position in the 1990s, however the change was short-lived. When the army took over the government on October 12, 1999, the elected administration of Nawaz Sharif was terminated once more under fourth Martial Law. This was challenged in the Zafar Ali Shah Case in 2000, but the verdict reflected the same old mindset as in the 1950s, and the case was resolved in favour of the military administration based on the well-known Doctrine of Necessity. The era of General Pervez Musharraf is significant in Pakistan's judicial history since it was the first time that the problem of judicial independence in Pakistan was brought to worldwide attention. The judiciary legitimized the overthrow of an elected government, and Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry was appointed Chief Justice under General Pervez Musharraf's first PCO, which was issued on October 14, 1999.

However, relations between the two deteriorated in 2006. The turbulence arose as a result of the Supreme Court's decision to block the privatization of Pakistan Steels. The Supreme Court displayed great bravery when it began to hold President Pervez Musharraf accountable for his conduct. All of this fostered a climate of distrust since the Supreme Court was asked to rule on a very important topic arising from General Pervez Musharraf's office. As a result, the President of Pakistan removed the Chief Justice of Pakistan from his position on March 9, 2007, in accordance with Article 209 of the Constitution. First, the Supreme Judicial Council restrained Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry from performing official duties, which sparked outrage. The legal community, civil society representatives, and students joined and demand that the Chief Justice be removed from office. The opposing political parties took advantage of the situation and turned it into a mass protest. They advocated for the rule of law, the supremacy of the constitution, and the independence of the judiciary. According to survey key allies in lawyers' movement were with 30 percent bar councils, media 45percent, students 10 percent, and political parties 15percent. The Supreme Court Bench, having 13 judges, reinstated the Chief justice with majority of ten to three, headed by justice Khalil-ur –Rehman Ramday with short order on 20th July 2007. It took 143 days for restoration of Chief Justice.

The public organized the enormous celebrations, and the Supreme Court, which had kneeled in the Molvi Tamizuddin Case Khan, finally stood up to its constitutionally mandated job with the support of the people's effort. It was assumed that this judgment would have a long-term impact on Pakistan's judicial system, however the third November 2007 crises proved this notion false. The "Depoliticization of State Institutions" was one of General Pervez Musharraf's agenda objectives, but practice demonstrated the opposite. The departure of the Chief Justice had shocked the entire country and turned Pakistan into a laughingstock. The Chief Justice's departure from office twice had done irreparable harm to Pakistan's reputation, both externally and internally (Hussain, 2007).

Despite the fact that political parties and lawyers are split, exceptional unity has been noticed among them. The Lawyers Movement demonstrated that a community's effort for a just cause is never in vain. The judicial crisis has institutional ramifications, resulting in legal, political, and institutional degradation. The political structure of the judiciary was not only affected, but the economy of Pakistan was also reduced. This harmed Pakistan's worldwide image and produced instability in the country. Despite all of Pakistan's miseries as a result of the judicial crisis, it is undeniable that the reinstatement of Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry heralded a new era in Pakistan's judicial history.

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An Appraisal

Under the 1935 Act, the Viceroy(executive) grip was much over other organs and that practice was preserved even in post-independence era by Governor General which persuaded it to dissolve the

Constituent Assembly. Due to support of strong executive the dissolution was justified under Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan Vs. Federation of Pakistan Case. The judgment in Maulvi Tamizuddin case considerably undermined its prestigious. Pakistan's first Constitution, adopted in 1956, had guarantees for judicial independence, as stipulated by the Objective Resolution of 1949. After two years, this was reversed with the introduction of martial law in October 1958. The Dosso Case called into question the abrogation of the 1956 Constitution and the implementation of Martial Law in 1958, but the Chief Justice Munir legitimized not only the coup but all subsequent regulations. That was another blow to the judiciary's independence, as the court circumscribed its own jurisdiction and extended the military stay.

The Dosso Case called into question the abrogation of the 1956 Constitution and the implementation of Martial Law in 1958, but the Chief Justice Munir legitimised not only the coup but all subsequent regulations. That was a further blow to the judiciary's independence, as the court curtailed its own jurisdiction and extended the military's stay. Hyper-technical issues such as Kelson Theory and the Doctrine of Necessity impeded the democratic process. The 1962 Constitution was enacted in order to preserve the democratic process. The Supreme Judicial Council was established to ensure that judges were held accountable, and this Constitution was repealed when Martial Law was declared in 1969. The Supreme Court considered the abrogation of the 1962 Constitution and the Martial Law of 1969 in the Asma Jilani Case (1972). The Supreme Court reversed the doctrinal basis on which the 1958 Martial Law was legitimized, and Yahya Khan was deemed a usurper as a result of this decision. This ruling allowed the judiciary to refrain from further correcting military regimes, resulting in the lifting of martial law in 1969. The Supreme Court considered the abrogation of the 1962 Constitution and the Martial Law of 1969 in the AsmaJilani Case (1972). The Supreme Court reversed the doctrinal basis on which the 1958 Martial Law was legitimised, and Yahya Khan was deemed a usurper as a result of this decision. This ruling allowed the judiciary to refrain from further correcting military regimes, resulting in the lifting of martial law in 1969. Following the lifting of martial law, attempts were made to establish a constitutional framework, which resulted in the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution. The Article 2-A of the 1973 Constitution guaranteed judicial independence. The terms of employment for judges were spelled out in great detail, but subsequent changes to the Constitution severely limited this idea. This Constitution was suspended for a limited time by General Zia, who toppled Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in July 1977 and imposed martial law. The Martial Law of 1977 was challenged in Nusrat Bhutto Case 1977 which given opportunity to judiciary to follow the AsmaJilani judgment but on the Doctrine of Necessity this martial law was legitimized.

The Article 2-A of the 1973 Constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary. The terms of employment for judges were spelled out in detail, but subsequent revisions to the Constitution severely limited this idea. General Zia, who toppled Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in July 1977 and imposed martial law, suspended the Constitution for a limited time. The 1977 Martial Law was challenged in the Nusrat Bhutto Case, which gave the judiciary the possibility to follow the Asma Jilani verdict, but this martial law was legitimized based on the Doctrine of Necessity. The judiciary suffered defeats during General Zia's administration as a result of many constitutional amendments and promulgation of Provisional Constitutional Order. The Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto trial cast doubt on the judiciary's independence under Zia's reign. General Pervez Musharraf followed in the footsteps of General Zia. In Pakistan, the judiciary's independence has been curtailed not only by the military administrations, but also by civilian governments.

The military takeover was not only legitimised by the judiciary based on theories, but the government actually intervened in court processes and intimidated judges, particularly the Superior Courts. The Supreme Court made an exception in the Asma Jilani case, which involved a case against a military

dictator that was decided when there was no military rule in place. When a sword hangs over a judge's head, he or she is unable to exert any influence.

The independence of the judiciary is dependent not only on statutory norms, but also on judges' responsibility to protect their institution from all arbitrary attacks. They must uphold the integrity and prestige of the judiciary. Solidarity among judges on this issue can also help to promote the independence of the judiciary in Pakistan. A procedure for the promotion, removal, and accountability of judges must be outlined in the Constitution. The legal system that the British abandoned is still popular. We must progressively replace it with an Islamic legal system that ensures justice for all, regardless of social background.

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